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to all persons. As our medical care has become more 
sophisticated, more powerful, and more expensive, however, 
some important questions have arisen about the meaning of 
"providing an adequate level of medical care to all." 
What is such an adequate level? Are we capable of providing 
it? Can v/e afford it? If we can, should it be the job of 
government or that of the private sector to provide it? 
The definition of an adequate level of medical care is 
in part a function of our ability to provide it. Although 
a serious attempt to determine such a level must be included 
at some point in any definitive exploration of the issues 
of the public role in health care financing, I will not 
make that attempt in this essay. Instead, I will accept as 
adequate that level of care normally available to persons for 
whom no major social or economic barriers to receipt of that 
care exist. 
The most common focus of complaints about the medical 
care crisis is the issue of financial cost. Expenditures 
for personal medical care in the United States now exceed 
nine percent of the gross national product. Technically, 
this figure could be allowed to increase until the diversion 
of productive capacity to medical care led to health hazards 
that exceeded new benefits. There are, however, many com¬ 
peting claims for those productive resources. As medical 
care becomes more elaborate and demands for it more extra¬ 
vagant, a point may be reached where social or ethical 
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considerations make further demands for medical care 
invalid. How can we balance our desire for medical care 
against our desire for other goods and services? 
John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice is an attempt 
to describe and to support with rational argument one 
system of social justice which may be used to determine 
priorities in a complex society. The conception of justice 
which Rawls provides is developed in an ideal system. Its 
application to the real world is therefore accompanied by 
all the problems that exist in the failure of the real world 
to meet ideal conditions. At the same time, however, the 
principles of Rawls's theory are remarkably "American", 
and may prove a useful yardstick against which to measure 
American institutions. For this purpose, they have the 
advantages of existing independently of the pulls of real 
social and political forces, and of lacking the complex and 
weighty baggage of American constitutional law, which pro¬ 
vides the basis for the final arbitration of social as 
well as legal justice in the United States today. 
In this essay I will examine several means of financing 
medical care. These correspond roughly to some of the 
major proposals for national health insurance that have 
been introduced in Congress. I hope, with the aid of 
Rawls's theory, to show that one of these approaches 
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presents an ethically preferable alternative to the others 
and to the current system of medical care financing. This 
alternative is a federally financed program of comprehensive 
medical care for all residents of the United States. 
I hope that my primary audience will be in the health 
care professions. Because of this, it is necessary to 
attempt to summarize Rawls's v/ork, so that the form and 
content of the discussions which follow will not be too 
obscure. Once this groundwork has been laid out, I will 
present an argument for the applicability of the theory 
to the problem of health care financing. Finally, I will 
move to the application of the theory, using it to look 
at the relative merits of five schemes of financing. 

5 
RAWLS'S THEORY OE JUSTICE 
Rawls calls his theory "justice as fairness". It 
consists of principles that he claims would be adopted to 
govern the basic structure of society by a group of free 
and rational parties to a hypothetical "original position 
of equality."^ Justice as fairness is a modern social 
contract theory, with its original position substituted 
for the state of nature in traditional social contract 
theory. This conception of justice is presented as a 
logical result of the nature of the original position 
and of the parties in that position. 
Rawls's conception of justice is not finally 
determined by the original position, however. Rather, it 
is the position that is determined by the conception of 
justice. In his 1958 essay, "Justice as Fairness", 
Rawls proposed the two principles of justice that are 
2 
found again m A Theory of Justice. Yet his argument in 
support of these principles is based on a different con¬ 
tract situation. In A Theory of Justice, while he generally 
argues from the base of the original position, he states 
at the outset that the original position is "a purely 
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a 
3 
certain conception of justice." Indeed, the final test 
of the adequacy of the principles of justice is not based 
on the original position at all, but on how they accord 
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with our considered judgements. 
While the principles for which Rawls argues are not 
essentially tied to the original position, that position, 
and the details of the interpretation and application of 
the principles, are integral parts of Rawls's theory. The 
nature of society; the nature of the individuals within 
society; and the nature of their participation, and of 
their understanding of their participation, in that society 
are all carefully defined and limited. 
The result of these limits is an ideal theory of 
justice for an ideal situation. Rawls recognizes the 
inadequacy of this result, noting that the most important 
and difficult problems for any theory of justice are those 
that occur only in a non-ideal society. He asserts, however, 
that ideal theory provides "the only basis for the system¬ 
atic grasp of these more pressing problems."^ Such a 
grasp of some of the problems of access to health care 
is the goal of this essay. 
The Original Position 
Rawls calls the situation in which the contracting 
parties in justice as fairness initially join together the 
original position. The detailed description of this position 
is an attempt to put forward the "most philosophically 
favored interpretation of the initial choice situation for 
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the purposes of a theory of justice." Such an inter¬ 
pretation should rest on a minimal set of assumptions, 
each of which seems natural and not controversial. 
The first of these assumptions is that the parties in 
the original position share an understanding of the proper 
subject and of the concept of justice. Many things may be 
called just or unjust. Individual acts, institutional 
acts, laws, and societies may all be so characterized. 
The parties in the original position are primarily concerned 
with social justice. They all recognize that the proper 
subject of social justice is the basic structure of society. 
This is so because the effects of that structure are so 
profound. The basic structure determines 
the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.? 
If the basic structure is unjust, then there will be no 
consistent justice at all. 
Their shared concept of justice is that it is the 
proper balance between competing claims within a society. 
The parties may differ as to what constitutes a proper 
balance, and as to how it should be reached. These are 
the considerations of their individual conceptions of 
justice, which need not be in agreement as the parties 
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come to the original position. All that they must 
acknowledge at the outset is that it is Dossible to reach 
a proper balance, whatever that balance may be, between 
competing claims; and that such a balance is the goal of 
the development and adoption of a theory of justice. 
The task in the original position is the development of 
a "set of related principles for identifying the relevant 
Q 
considerations which determine" what a proper balance is. 
Another major assumption in the original position is 
of the limitations on the nature of society. The society 
in question is a totally self-contained social system. It 
is also what Rawls calls a well-ordered society. It is 
designed to advance the good of its members and 
effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice. Thus it is a society in which everyone 
accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles of justice, and the basic social 
institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy 
these principles. 
These limitations are adopted by Rawls as simplifying 
assumptions, with the recognition that they define an 
idealized society. 
The society in question must also be necessary or 
desirable to its members. Certain simple conditions, 
which are accepted as part of the original position, exist. 
While no member of the society is able to dominate all 
others, it may be necessary for all to join together to 

avoid being subjugated by a second society. Additionally, 
the conditions in which the society exists are conditions 
of moderate scarcity. Goods and the means of acquiring 
them are neither present in Edenic abundance, making 
cooperation unnecessary, nor are they so scarce that 
10 
cooperative efforts are doomed to fail. 
Rawls makes two more major assumptions about the 
structure of society. He calls these conditions chain 
connection and close-knitness. Chain connection says 
that whenever the position of the least advantaged class 
is improved, the positions of all classes of society are 
improved. It makes no statement about what happens when 
the position of the least advantaged is not improved. 
Close-knitness covers that possibility by saying that any 
change in the basic structure changes the absolute position 
of all classes of society. Thus a benefit for any class 
in society is a benefit for all classes, and a loss for 
one is a loss for all.1'^ 
It is not at all clear that this can be held to be the 
case in any real society. If it could be made to be true, 
however, it would simplify all of tne functions of society. 
Conflicts would never result from the utilitarian practice 
of damaging the overall interests of some for the benefit 
of others. One group might derive benefit from a change 
that limited the degree of benefit to others, but it would 
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not be allowed to benefit by changes that removed all 
benefits to another group. The closest any real society 
may come to this ideal is to attempt to pass legislation 
that seriously tries to effect it. 
The assumptions of chain connection and close-knitness 
are in essence the rules behind consensus decision making. 
If any party in a consensus seeking process feels that the 
disadvantages of a proposal outweigh its benefits, that 
party can veto the proposal. While this method of decision 
making usually elicits altruistic behavior from those 
involved, altruism is not required of them. Rather, it is 
freely chosen by them either because they value altruism 
per se, or because they recognize that it is central to 
the successful functioning of a group whose successful 
functioning they value. 
Mandating chain connection and close-knitness similarly 
tends to emphasize the social effects of any choice. A 
decision that benefits a large majority of a society may 
have certain undesired costs for the minority. If the 
personal benefits to the many are great enough, and the 
personal harm to the few slight enough, however, the net 
outcome for the few may still be (and, hopefully, be per¬ 
ceived as) a benefit, because of the positive influence of 
the decision on social stability and cooperation. 
One reason that the structure of United States society 
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does not appear clearly to be more chain connected and 
close-knit than it does is that the effects on social 
stability and cooperation of individual acts of social law 
are usually seen as trivial. The stabilizing effects of 
federal social policies as a whole, however, are not 
trivial. In order to maximize the stabilizing effects of 
any social legislation, we should maximize its compliance 
with chain connection and close-knitness. 
In addition to such social considerations, Rawls 
notes certain facts about the parties in the original position. 
The various parties are similar, but not identical to each 
other. While they have certain shared needs and interests, 
they also have individual interests that may be either 
complementary or conflicting. Each party has a preference 
for an individual plan of life based on an individual set 
of values. 
One common fact about the parties is that they are 
what Rawls refers to as continuing persons. While they 
are not assigned duties to those who will succeed them in 
society, their interests do include consideration of at 
least some of those in the next succeeding generation. 
Thus, for example, the interests of parents could be 
12 
expected to include those of their children. This 
condition is necessary to assure the continuity of a well- 
ordered society under the permanently binding agreement 

12 
that the parties in the original position are to reach. 
This sense of continuity leads to Rawls's just savings 
principle, which requires a level of savings which 
equitably distributes advantages among current and 
succeeding generations.^ 
Finally, the parties exercise mutually disinterested 
rationality. They are able to assign priorities to the 
elements of their plans of life, and they act in ways that 
are calculated to maximally satisfy these plans. They do 
14 
this without envy for the position of others. The nature 
of rationality is central to justice as fairness. In order 
to simplify discussion of that nature, I will first com¬ 
plete the description of the original position in which the 
individuals' rationality is called into play. 
In order to strengthen the argument for justice as 
fairness, Rawls seeks to rely upon a minimal number of 
assumptions. This approach is necessary to minimize 
criticism of the theory. It is also a reasonable approach 
for the group of diverse parties in the original position. 
It is desirable to minimize the grounds for disagreement 
among them. The process of deriving principles of justice 
proceeds from these minimal assumptions. The set of 
assumptions is enlarged only so long as it is insufficient 
to support a significant set of principles of justice. 
Rawls assumes tnat such a set of principles can be developed 
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while the assumptions are still reasonably limited. 
The test of the adequacy of the set of principles is 
16 
that they "match our considered judgements." Rawls calls 
the state of affairs that exists when this test is met 
reflective equilibrium. In the attempt to reach reflective 
equilibrium, both the considered judgements and the proposed 
set of principles will change as they shed light on one 
another. Considered judgements are not guaranteed to be 
flawless. Rather, 
All judgements are likely to be erroneous or to be 
influenced by an excessive attention to our own interests. 
Considered judgements are simply those rendered under 
conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of 
justice, and therefore in circumstances where the more 
common excuses ,-pnd explanations for making a mistake 
do not obtain.' 
In order to minimize the effects of undue self-interest in 
the original position, Rawls introduces one of the most 
important aspects of the original position, the veil of 
ignorance. 
The veil of ignorance is a device that makes it possible 
for the parties in the original position to reach agreement. 
It denies to each party any knowledge of his or her par¬ 
ticular situation. While the general facts about the 
nature and behaviors of human societies are known to the 
parties, specific details of their own society and of their 
own social position, wealth, income, relative intelligence 
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and strength, and personal plans of life are all unknown. 
It is therefore impossible for any of the parties to ration¬ 
ally propose any principle of justice that would enhance his 
or her individual prospects more than those of any other 
party. Instead, the parties can only advance their own 
interests in the most general ways. In order to insure 
that a principle proposed in the original position will be 
beneficial to any one party, it must necessarily be of 
benefit to all parties. This effect of the veil of ignor- 
18 
ance is crucial to the theory of justice as fairness. 
Rawls also places certain limits on the alternatives 
that the parties in the original position may consider. 
These "constraints on the concept of right" are as follows: 
A conception of right is a set of principles, general 
in form and universal in application, that is to be 
publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for 
ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons. 
Principles of justice are identified by their special 
role and the subject to which they apply. 19 
These conditions (generality, universality, publicity, 
ordering, and finality) will be true of any principles of 
justice for a well-ordered society which have been 
rationally agreed to in the original position. They may 
also prove particularly helpful in deciding whether a 




The parties in the original position are mutually 
disinterested and rational. That is, the parties are un¬ 
affected by envy, and they try their best to advance their 
private interests. While in the original position, however, 
they do not know what these interests are. Instead, they 
assume simply that they would prefer more rather than less 
of the social goods that are generally necessary to the 
20 
accomplishment of any plan of life. The nature of this 
preference is peculiar in that it refuses to accept any 
risk of loss in exchange for an increased chance of gain. 
Rawls assumes that any rational decision to accept a risk 
must be based on judgements of the probability of loss 
which have a basis in known facts. Since the necessary 
facts are hidden by the veil of ignorance, it is irrational 
21 
to accept any risk in the original position. 
Since the parties may not knowingly accept any risks, 
and since they all know that each of them has an equal 
chance of being in the least advantaged position in society, 
they are led to accept what Rawls calls the maximin rule. 
Under this rule, they select a set of principles of justice 
which guarantees that the worst possible outcome is least 
bad. In choosing in accordance with this rule, the parties 
may be forced to give up a set of principles in which the 
best possible outcome or the average outcome is clearly 
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superior to the best or average outcome of the chosen set 
of principles. This would seem to be justified, because 
the parties are unable to estimate the probabilities of any 
of the outcomes, and the relative cost of a unit loss to 
the least advantaged party may well be unacceptable while 
the relative cost of a unit loss to the most advantaged 
will, in all likelihood, be easily acceptable. 
Rawls provides a second rationale for the maximin rule 
in the principle of responsibility to self. One is not 
required to avoid all risks, only those that are not 
worthwhile. One must be able to affirm, even if the worst 
possible outcome should occur, that the choice to assume 
the risk of that outcome was worthwhile when considered 
22 
against the potential gains. Since the parties are 
seeking to advance their interests by securing primary 
goods, and since there must be some quantity of primary 
goods that constitutes a functional minimum, the parties 
would violate their responsibility to self if they were 
to accept less than that minimum. While such an accept¬ 
able minimum might in a wealthy society be far below the 
maximin, it is likely to be similar to it under the assumed 
condition of moderate scarcity. 
The maximin rule is only justified when no reasonable 
estimates of the relative probabilities of various outcomes 
are possible. It holds in the original position, but fails 
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once the veil of ignorance is lifted enough for the 
individuals to know the specifics of their society, or 
of their plans of life. Outside of the original position, 
rational choice is still governed by certain principles, 
but the essential task of assigning relative values to 
various outcomes is necessarily left to the individuals' 
23 
subjective preferences. 
Taken as a whole, Rawls's principles of rational choice 
tend to maximize the realization of goals while minimizing 
the expense of means. The first of the three principles 
is that of effective means. It states that, given a 
particular objective and several alternative means to achieve 
it (those means being otherwise neutral), then we are to 
choose the alternative that realizes the objective with the 
least expense of means; or, given the means and several 
different ways of employing them to achieve the objective, 
we are to achieve the objective as fully as possible. The 
next principle is that of inclusiveness. It states that, 
given two plans, we are to choose the one that achieves all 
of the objectives of the other plan plus at least one more 
objective. (Tnis principle is inapplicable if neither plan 
includes all of the goals of the other.) The last principle 
is that of greater likelihood. This states that, given two 
plans with essentially the same goals, and given further 
that one has a greater chance of achieving some of its goals 
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without at the same time a lesser chance of achieving the 
rest, then we are to choose the plan that has the greater 
24 
likelihood of success. 
These principles govern the process of choosing one's 
plans, a process Rawls calls deliberative rationality. 
In this process one chooses a plan after reviewing 
in the light of all the relevant facts, v/hat it 
would be like to carry out these plans and thereby 
[ascertaining] the course of action that would2c. 
best realize [one's] more fundamental desires. ^ 
Several assumptions accompany this process. It includes no 
errors in calculation, reasoning, or assessment of the 
facts. Also, the deliberating person has a complete and 
accurate understanding of his or her own desires, and of 
the situation, including all relevant circumstances. An 
individual who selects a plan under these constraints will 
select an objectively rational plan. If, as is generally 
the case, it is impossible to have complete and accurate 
information, then the individual will select a subjectively 
rational plan.^ 
The parties in the original position are rational 
persons, and all possess rational plans of life, although 
the specifics of those plans are hidden by the veil of 
ignorance. Rawls defines a rational plan of life as a 
plan, consistent with the principles of rational choice, 
that a person would choose with full deliberative rationality 27 
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Since a plan of life is a long term plan, much, if 
not most, of the data necessary to chart a specific course 
of action is unavailable. The earliest steps in a rational 
plan of life might be obvious, but later steps would hinge 
on knowledge that is unavailable when the plan is formed. 
The plan must incorporate a principle of postponement, 
allowing certain details to be filled in at some future 
time when the relative merits of various alternatives can 
28 
be assessed. The less information a person has available 
when forming a plan of life, the more varied must be the 
alternatives allowed by the plan. Thus, in the opening 
position, the parties' best chance of assuring the promotion 
of their plans of life comes with maximizing the range of 
possible alternatives. It would be irrational for any of 
them to agree to principles of justice that would reduce 
this range if any less limiting principles could win 
agreement. 
Primary Goods 
Rawls assumes that the basic structure of society is 
concerned with the distribution of goods.The goods in 
question need not be goods in the sense of merchandise; 
they include anything that a person with a rational plan 
of life might rationally want. Those things that would be 
such goods for any person are human goods.^ Those human 
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goods which a rational person would want, regardless 
of whatever else he or she might want, and regardless of 
31 
the details of his or her plan of life, are primary goods. 
The primary goods can be categorized in various ways. 
Rawls differentiates social primary goods and natural 
primary goods. Among the former he lists rights, powers, 
opportunities, income, and wealth. These are social goods 
because they are defined and regulated by the basic structure 
32 
of society, through its major institutions. Among the 
natural goods Rawls lists health, vigor, intelligence, and 
imagination. Although the basic structure has some influence 
• • • 33 
over these, there are distinct limits to that influence. 
Another primary good, which is neither strictly social nor 
natural, is self-respect. 
Rawls considers self-respect the most important primary 
good. This good has two parts. The first part is a sense 
of the value of one’s plan of life. Such a sense generally 
depends, at least in part, on the respect of others. With¬ 
out the knowledge that others appreciate one's plan, it is 
difficult to retain a sense of its worth. Only when that 
sense of worth is maintained can one pursue one's goals 
with enthusiasm and can one delight in their fulfillment. 
The second part of self-respect is confidence in one's 
ability to pursue one's plan of life. Following a plan 
under a cloud of self-doubt is difficult and discouraging. 
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Self-respect is for Rawls the most important primary good, 
because without it "all desire and activity becomes empty 
34 
and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism."^ 
The primary goods are included among the things that 
any rational person wants precisely because they are 
necessary to the pursuit of any rational plan of life. 
The parties in the original position cannot bargain away 
any of these without being sure that in doing so the worst 
possible position in which they might find themselves when 
the veil of ignorance is lifted is being improved. 
Rawls's Conception of Justice 
Rawls uses these assumptions, definitions, and deriv¬ 
ations to support a general and a special conception of 
justice. The general conception is as follows: 
All social values -- liberty and opportunity, income 
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect -- are to 
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution 
of any, or all, of these values is to the advantage of 
the least favored.35 
In order to simplify the application of this conception, 
Rawls develops a special case of it, which consists of two 
principles and two priority rules. 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
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Second Principle [The Difference Principle] 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan¬ 
taged, consistent with the just savings principle, 
and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty) 
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical 
order and therefore liberty can be restricted only 
for the sake of liberty. . . 
Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over 
Efficiency and Welfare) 
The second principle of justice is lexically prior 
to the principle of efficiency and to that of 
maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity 
is prior to the difference principle. There are two 
cases: 
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance 
the opportunities of those with the lesser 
opportunity; 
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance 
mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship. 
In interpreting the relative advantage that any social 
arrangement holds for the least favored, that advantage is 
to be interpreted in terms of the benefits it presents for 
the plans of life of the people in the least favored class. 
The general conception of justice defines in the 
broadest terms the distribution of social goods that the 
basic structure of a just society should provide. It is a 
straightforward result of the maximin rule subject to all 
of the constraints of the original position: the ration¬ 
ality of the parties, the veil of ignorance, the constraints 
on the concept of right, the proper subject of justice, the 
nature of a well-ordered society. 
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The special conception of justice is less easily 
derived from the original position, because of its 
priority rules. The lexical priority of liberty is far 
from obvious. It states that the demands of equal and 
maximal liberty be met regardless of the effect on social 
and economic inequalities. The potential injustice 
resulting from the application of such a statement in 
the real world is obvious. It is unclear, however, that 
the radical dissociation of liberties from social and 
economic status presents a meaningful possibility. Rawls's 
own interpretation of the first priority rule is "that the 
basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of 
wealth and authority in ways consistent with the equal 
37 
liberties required." Such an arrangement should be 
possible in the ideal society being built by the parties in 
the original position. 
Historically, however, wealth and power have not 
been distributed in accordance with the principle of equal 
liberties. This creates the problem of perpetuating de 
facto inequalities of liberty by imposing the radical 
priority of liberty on a society frought with economic and 
political injustice. The installation of justice as 
fairness as the new basis for a previously unjust society 
may require serious and extraordinarily difficult redis¬ 
tribution of primary goods before meaningful equality of 
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liberty exists. The problem, aside from the difficulty of 
developing a constitution and legislation that would 
actually work to implement justice as fairness, stems in 
the end from the fact that a well-ordered society is the 
only society in which Rawls's theory can be applied without 
major changes. The importance of the theory is that it 
provides a clear ideal toward the realization of which 
society may strive, but which it can at best approximate. 
Rawls argues that it is rational for the parties in 
the original position to accept the priority of liberty 
because of the effects of doing so on the bases of self- 
respect. He states that it is through the public guarantee 
of equal liberties that the parties in the original position 
will assure themselves of the respect of others that is 
crucial to their self-respect. The assurance of maximal 
and equal liberty further assures the parties that they will 
be allowed the greatest possible latitude in framing their 
plans of life. While trading wealth for liberty might 
accord with certain specific plans of life, the sacrifice 
of liberty might, sooner or later, irrevokably block the 
execution of those or many other plans of life. By 
assuring the right to choose and carry out a wide variety 
of plans, the priority of liberty tends also to assure the 
IQ 
parties' self-respect. 7 
Rawls further supports the priority of liberty by 
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invoking its stabilizing effect on society. In a society 
that affirms the paramount importance of equal and 
maximal liberties, the bases of self-respect are at least 
to an extent assured by the status of equal citizenship. 
In a society where wealth or social status is considered 
most important, there will be a tendency for one's self- 
respect to vary in accordance with one's share in these. 
Those with relatively less self-respect would try to 
improve their position by increasing their wealth or 
social status. In a self-contained society, however, this 
is often only possible by reducing the wealth or status of 
another. The persons in such a society have an incentive 
for competition rather than for cooperation. The mutual 
disinterest of the parties would no longer be a natural 
assumption. Envy, jealousy, and mistrust would be likely. 
Social union, with its attendant stability and sense of 
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harmony, would be extremely unlikely. The priority of 
liberty thus helps to provide that measure of coordination 
and stability which is essential to the viability of any 
41 
human community. 
The second priority rule is that fair equality of 
opportunity takes precedence over the distribution of 
social and economic goods. Fair equality of opportunity 
may not be sacrificed to increase economic gain for either 
the least advantaged or society as a whole. Truly fair 
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equality may only be possible if society assumes certain 
burdens of a remedial nature. Special educational oppor¬ 
tunities and affirmative action programs are examples of 
such measures that might be used to help provide truly equal 
opportunities for certain socially disadvantaged groups. 
The second priority rule is thus a statement of the economic 
and social priority of guaranteeing that historic and social 
fortune will not deprive an individual of a meaningfully 
equal chance to compete in the employment marketplace. It 
is a statement of economic commitment to the priority of 
liberty. 
The two priority rules are not absolute and inviolable. 
While lexical ordering is, by definition, absolute, the 
impossibility of strictly separating basic equal rights 
from equal opportunity, and both from social and economic 
inequalities, may make observation of absolute priority 
violate our best considered judgements. In such cases 
the general conception of justice is the principle to 
which final appeal is made. The role of priority rules is 
that of reducing the reliance on intuitive judgements that 
is necessary when trying to compare the value of liberty 
v/ith that of wealth or social stature. A lexical order, 
"while it . . . cannot be strictly correct . . . may be an 
illuminating approximation under certain special though 
• . . . . U9 
significant conditions." The general conception pro- 
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vides the correction factor when the lexical order fails 
to satisfy the test of reflective equilibrium. 
Application of the Principles of Justice 
Part of the theory of justice as fairness is a 
description of how it is to be put into practice. Rawls 
suggests a four stage sequence. The first stage is the 
process of defining and accepting principles of justice. 
(Rawls's theory includes his version of the principles.) 
The second stage is that of a constitutional convention to 
frame a constitution in agreement with these principles. 
The government established by that constitution then 
performs the third stage, the enactment of just legislation. 
Finally, the executive and judicial officers of the 
government implement, enforce, and interpret the laws on 
the level of individual actions. At each stage after the 
first, the veil of ignorance is lifted to allow the persons 
working at each stage to have the information that they 
need to maximize the appropriateness of their efforts. 
Not until individual, personal details are necessary in 
applying the laws does the veil of ignorance lift so high 
43 
as to allow any knowledge of such details. 
Throughout, it is clear that the principles of justice 
are put into effect by a formal governmental body. This 
is necessary because there must be an arbiter of competing 
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claims, and because there must be a party whose only 
interest is justice and whose job it is to perform the 
distributions of primary goods that are necessary in 
order to maintain a just and stable order. Rawls suggests 
branches of the government with the tasks of maintaining 
a fair, competitive market sector; assuring the avail¬ 
ability of enough to work to assure reasonably full 
employment; assuring the provision of the agreed social 
minimum; and managing a scheme of taxation for the purposes 
of (1) gradually and continually redistributing wealth so 
that the distribution does not subvert the principle of 
equal liberties, and (2) providing the revenues necessary 
for any transfer payments required for a distribution of 
goods in accordance with the second principle, the difference 
. . 44 
principle. 

THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AS A MODEL 
FOR UNITED STATES SOCIAL POLICY 
29 
The principles of the priority of equal liberty and 
of equal opportunity are well established in American 
constitutional law. The Bill of Rights, the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 
and a multitude of court decisions have firmly established 
these principles. They have also provided judicial remedy 
in many cases in which legislation enabling effective 
exercise of these rights has been lacking. Detailed 
analysis of the law in this regard is beyond the scope 
of this essay. 
The congruence of the difference principle with the 
American system is less obvious. The distribution of 
inequalities so that they are to the benefit of the least 
advantaged has no specific parallel in the constitution 
or in its interpretation. However, something like the 
difference principle can be seen at work in the presence of 
a significant system of welfare rights and benefits which 
has existed, in one form or another, throughout the entire 
course of United States history. In order to elucidate 
the principles behind the welfare functions of modern 
America, it is necessary to examine the roots of those 
rights and benefits. 
The heart of public welfare policy in the United 

States, from earliest colonial days to the twentieth 
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century, was set out in the English poor law of 1601, 
and in the laws simplifying the establishment of charitabl 
. 46 
trusts in 1597 and 1601. These laws marked the reso¬ 
lution of a problem that had been growing in England 
since the fourteenth century. This problem was the 
appearance for the first time of a class of able-bodied 
poor who were eager to work, but for whom no work could 
be found. 
Until the sixteenth century, the English attitudes 
toward the poor had been simple. Those who were unable 
to work and who lacked families who could support them 
were supported, either by church alms or by publicly 
47 
accepted begging. Those who were able to work but were 
unemployed were considered sinners and scoundrels, and 
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were subject to punishment as vagrants. This harsh 
attitude stemmed from a real problem with a large class 
49 
of roving criminal vagabonds, and a failure to 
recognize that for many there was no work available.^ 
During the sixteenth century England turned further 
toward a mercantile economy, and the problem of unemploy¬ 
ment worsened. The economic change, along with the 
impropriation of church lands, led to the conversion of 
arable land to pasture, which in turn caused rural unem¬ 
ployment. The rural poor often entered the towns and 
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cities in search of work for which they were not trained, 
creating a class of urban unemployed. As these groups 
grew they caused growing concern, which generated a long 
series of laws which first recognized that not all unem¬ 
ployment of the able-bodied was voluntary and to be 
punished, and then established programs to provide for the 
5? 
needs of these people. 
The poor law of 1601 established a secular organization 
to levy taxes for the support of the poor. This hierarchy 
was based locally and charged to look after the needs of 
the poor within each parish. Rarely, however, did it feel 
compelled to act. During the first twenty years of the 
seventeenth century, ninety-three percent of the poor relief 
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was provided by private charity. v 
The laws encouraging private giving were the backbone 
of the system. Charitable giving, largely in the form of 
the endowment of ongoing trusts, quadrupled in the period 
1630-1620A*4 The capacity for government participation was 
able to be held in reserve as the merchant and gentry 
classes gave generously in response to the exhortations 
of the clergy. 
While the church was much less of a conduit for poor 
relief than it had once been, the Protestant ethic being 
preached by the clergy effectively encouraged secular giving. 
The rich were given their wealth in stewardship for all, 

and had a religious duty to share it to ease the plight 
of the less fortunate. Charity, however, should be given 
in such ways that the poor were benefited in spirit as 
well as in body. The sin of indolence was not to be 
encouraged by poorly thought out gifts.^ The taint of 
evil was still firmly attached to some poverty. 
The laws and attitudes concerning the poor were 
brought to the English colonies in America, where they 
formed the basis of colonial welfare policy. In the 
colonies, however, the economic situation was quite unlike 
that of England. During the first terrible years in the 
New World, famine and disease, not unemployment, were the 
dominant problems. Survival required hard work. Farming 
techniques had to be adapted to new conditions in order to 
yield harvests that provided more than bare subsistence. 
At times, mutual aid in even the smallest tasks was 
essential. During a smallpox epidemic in the Plymouth 
colony in 1620, 
In ye time of most distress, there wus but 6. or 7* 
sound persons, who . . . spared no pains night nor 
day, but . . . did all ye homly & necessarie offices 
for them. 66 
It rapidly became clear to the colonists that theirs were 
communities in which all shared equally in the same hard 
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life, and the more work a person could do, the greater 
57 
his or her value to the community. 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
colonies had become well established. ho longer a few 
scattered settlements, their population had reached 
rO 
250,000. Mercantile centers along the coast provided 
a base that buffered the effects of local crop failures. 
A steady flow of new immigrants was attracted by the high 
wages in a labor-short land. The high wages enabled 
workers to buy inexpensive, rich farmland. With a seem¬ 
ingly endless supply of land, a continuous shortage of 
labor was assured, in marked contrast to the shortage of 
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jobs m England. 
These conditions of abundant land and scarce labor 
continued into the nineteenth century, forging the attitudes 
towards charity in the young United States. The colonial 
poor laws were changed only to accomodate the terminology 
of new monetary and governmental systems. The minimal 
needs of the truly impotent poor were met primarily through 
the same kind of mutual aid that had been a feature of 
society in America from the first colonies. The religious 
duty to work was strengthened by society's needs as much 
as by New England Puritanism. 
During over a century of chronic shortages of labor, 
the concept of the worthy able-bodied poor was forgotten. 

3^ 
The pauperism that was ubiquitous in sixteenth century 
England was rare in the United States. As one immigrant 
wrote, 
The Traveller's feelings are not harrowed at every 
turn by the sight of some squalid, ragged, wretched 
object in human shape. Indeed, during the whole two 
years of my residence in America, I saw but one 
beggar . . . 
The Tudor recognition that not all unemployment was 
voluntary, was irrelevant in a society with work for all. 
There are no roundsmen [laborers on relief sent from 
one employer to another to seek work] standing at the 
corners of their streets all day idle. To secure against 
the inconveniences resulting from a scarcity of 
labourers, some of the farmers take children of about 
six or seven years as apprentices . . . The apprentice 
is clothed, sent to school, and provided for until he 
is capable of working 
. . . is amply repaid. 
)n the farm, when his master 
>1 
This idyllic report may have been true of the frontier, 
but by the time of its publication in 1835 the urban 
population had passed one million, ^ and poverty and 
great hardship were common. 
hany of the ugliest problems were the product of 
bigotry and the self-interest of the powerful. Hob 
violence against aliens and freed slaves accepting low 
wages, Catholics exercising their freedom of religion, 
or abolitionists their free speech was not uncommon. In 
the factories and mills of New England, the ten hour day 
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was still over a decade away. One Fall River employer 
could speak of wearing out and discarding his laborers 
like so many machines, because their unskilled labor was 
easily replaced from among the city's unemployed poor. ^ 
Not all of the wealthy were quite so unkind to the 
poor. Many recognized and tried to deal with the problem 
of urban poverty. The early nineteenth century proposals 
provide more complex (if not necessarily more accurate) 
explanations of the problem than did those of Tudor 
England. One listed nine prominent causes of pauperism: 
ignorance, idleness, drunkenness, waste, unwise marriages, 
lotteries, pawnbrokers, prostitution, and charity. The 
way to respond to these causes was to give advice to the 
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poor on how they could better conduct their business. 
In another consideration of the problem, Josiah ^uincy wrote 
that poverty, vice, and crime "are so frequently found 
together, that in every general survey, they may be con¬ 
sidered, for the purpose of analysis and remark, in some 
measure as inseparable."^ In a report to the Massachusetts 
legislature, a committee chaired by ^uincy recommended 
compulsory work-houses as the most effective and economical 
solution to the problem of able-bodied poor.^ In none of 
these reports does there appear any recognition of the fact 
that had become clear in England more than two centuries 
earlier: poverty exists among the able-bodied because of 
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unemployment, not solely because of sinful behavior. 
The old concept of poverty as evidence of personal 
faults, and faults easily aggravated by too generous 
charity, formed the basis of the dominant social policy 
throughout the nineteenth century. The Christian duty 
to aid the needy was not lost, but it was countermanded 
by the idea that the poor were evil, and therefore unworthy 
of aid. Publicly funded almshouses and mental hospitals 
were rarely better than, and often not separate from, jails. 
Many private charities stressed the role of advice in 
helping the hopelessly poor to better themselves. The 
New York Association for Improving the Conditions of the 
Poor was a much imitated example. In instructions to its 
volunteers it stated that its goals were 
First, The moral and physical elevation of the poor; 
and Second, . . . the relief of their necessities. 
But this order, unhappily, has been too often 
reversed. . . Our principles here are clear as a 
sunbeam. They show that it is worse to debase by 
alms than to withhold them; that the physical must 
be subservient to the moral, and the moral receive 
the attention its paramount importance demands.66 
The few who recognized that unemployment and inadequate 
wages in the cities made poverty inescapable for many were 
no match for the potent force of self-righteousness. 
As the United States entered the twentieth century, 
it did so with a seventeenth century system and fifteenth 
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century attitudes toward its poor. Poverty was the 
disgraceful lot of the lazy. The workhouse was the most 
common way of dealing with the poor. Children were still 
indentured or apprenticed out. Applicants for relief were 
often required to swear that they were destitute and were 
68 
stripped of the right to vote or hold office. Although 
this system had "proven" its adequacy during several brief 
depressions in the nineteenth century, the crash of 1929 
and the Great Depression, with one fourth of the work force 
unemployed, made demands for public relief and private 
charity that it was totally unable to meet. 
The depression led to the implementation of "new" 
ideas about the government's relation to the poor. Clearly 
one fifth of the work force had not been siezed by a fit 
of mass indolence. Their poverty was no more the result 
of their own laziness than was that of the unemployed in 
the reign of Elizabeth I. For the first time in the United 
States, poverty among able-bodied persons who were eager to 
work was severe enough to bring the government to recognize, 
and to act to relieve, unwanted and undeserved poverty. 
With Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal a new understanding 
of the role of government in helping the poor emerged. The 
basic values of work and charity did not change. Rather, 
the problem was recognized as being too big for any private 
or local charity to solve. Only a massive effort by the 
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federal government would suffice to provide the help that 
was needed. In a 1932 campaign address, Roosevelt said 
that a person's right to life meant "the right to make a 
-69 
comfortable living," which m turn implied the right 
of the needy to a share in the relief being provided by 
their government. No longer was poverty justified as a 
part of God's divine order, as it had been by many from 
medieval England into twentieth century America. No longer 
would Adam Smith's argument for a free market, with the 
poverty that it always entailed, be accepted. The insight 
of Elizabeth's government, that there were able-bodied 
poor who needed and merited help, was finally rediscovered 
and given application with a vengeance in the United States. 
The New Deal marked a change in federal social and 
economic policy, from "benign neglect" to intervention, in 
an effort to guarantee a right to a decent life. For many 
liberal thinkers, this right grew out of basic freedoms. 
In the words of Louis D. Brandeis, "Financial dependence 
is consistent with freedom only where claim to support 
70 
rests upon right and not upon favor." rederal Emergency 
Relief Administrator Harry L. Hopkins concurred in 1936 
when he wrote that "there is no need for any American to be 
destitute, to be illiterate, to be reduced by the bondage 
of these things into either political or economic 
impotence."''7^ Congress passed and the courts upheld laws 
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guaranteeing basic rights for workers. The Social Security 
Act of 1935 ana its amendments assumed the oldest recognized 
poor relief burden -- the care of those too old, too young, 
or too infirm to work -- as well as the provision of 
services for the unemployed, maternal and child health, 
public health work, and health insurance for the poor and 
the aged. 
Throughout the last five hundred years, the English 
and American peoples have acknowledged the duty of society 
to provide for its truly needy, for its least advantaged 
persons. Variations in the nature of society, of its 
problems, and of its theories have led to varying 
responses to that duty. The philosophy of the New Deal 
and the Social Security Act, as amended, provide the 
modern American response. 
First, the least advantaged members of society have a 
right to a decent minimum standard of living. Persons 
with certain characteristics (e.g., elderly, disabled) 
are ipso facto assumed to have legitimate claims to 
society's aid. Other persons without these character¬ 
istics may well have equally legitimate claims, and must 
not be subjected to undue humiliation in pressing them. 
(It is recognized that, unfortunately, it is still humili¬ 
ating to many merely to press their claims.) 
Second, the duty to respond to the needs of the least 
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advantaged cannot be left to the voluntary recognition 
of those needs, and action by, those who are better off. 
The bankruptcy of the theory of relying solely on voluntary 
charity has been recognized since the sixteenth century. 
The nineteenth century version of voluntarism, in which 
the wealthy attempted to permanently uplift instead of 
temporarily relieve the poor did neither, and generally 
failed also to address social root causes of poverty. 
The development during the past hundred years of 
modern social sciences and statistical analysis have 
helped to revolutionize the care of the poor. They have 
led to the realization that most of the causes of poverty 
are beyond the control of any poor individual. They have 
aided in the development of the social work profession, 
whose job is to help society carry out its duty to its 
least advantaged, and to help them to overcome the social 
and economic forces that keep them in their disadvantaged 
7 2 
positions. Unfortunately, neither the scientific sophis¬ 
tication nor the resources devoted to the attempt have 
been sufficient to conquer the problems of poverty. 
Nevertheless, the American approach to poverty 
presents a remarkable system. It recognizes certain basic 
claims of the least advantaged, and provides a professional 
class of advocates who provide for the satisfaction of 
those claims and press for the acceptance of further, as 
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yet discounted, claims. The immediate benefits that this 
system provides to the least advantaged are great, no 
matter how much better they might be; the immediate 
benefits to the powerful are marginal, being only insurance 
against a 'Vvorst possible outcome” reversal of fortune. The 
cost of the system to the weak is nothing; the cost to the 
powerful is nearly unbearable (judging by their frequent 
compLaints.) While the stability and moral benefits of a 
just society are significant to the wealthy and powerful, 
they have never been sufficient to induce them to pay 
voluntarily the economic price for such a society. Indeed, 
it was not until this society was shocked by a global 
economic crisis that bankrupted many of the rich, that they 
found it worthwhile to pay the price of insuring society, 
and themselves, against a repetition of such a crisis. 
The similarity of this system and Rawls's difference 
principle is significant. Indeed, the limits to the 
similarity are those that are imposed by a society that is 
not well-ordered, and in which no veil of ignorance has 
mitigated the forces of self-interest. When the depression 
made it clear that even the rich might become the least 
advantaged, the minimum position of the least advantaged 
was improved. It might well have been maximized had those 
in power been less willing to gamble that they would stay in 
power. Their fears for their own positions were not strong 
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enough to make their self-interest seem to lie with an 
optimized worst outcome. 
The arguments put forward by both sides in the debate 
to change the minimum benefits are interestingly compatible 
with Rawls's theory. The rich and powerful argue that any 
further increase in the guaranteed minimum will put an 
unacceptable limitation on basic liberties. Those in favor 
of improving the least advantaged position respond that that 
position is so weak that it must be improved in order to 
allow fair (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity, 
and that the taxation necessary to provide for transfer 
payments to improve the worst position is not an infringe¬ 
ment on basic liberties. Many of the near poor who do not 
qualify for welfare benefits agree with the rich. They 
prefer the possibility of great wealth, no matter how 
unlikely, to any assurance of avoiding great poverty, in 
spite of how likely that might be. Free use of their income 
with a minimum of taxes is more valuable to them than is 
increasing the standard of living of the non-working poor. 
While the equation of taxation with infringement upon 
liberties is distinctly at variance with Rawls's easy 
acceptance of taxes, the two other arguments are quite 
powerful. Rawls would give precedence to the argument of 
the least favored group. The details of their position 
only give preference to increased transfer payments when 
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work is for some reason out of the question. When a 
job is an option, it is almost invariably the first 
choice, because, as Rawls would expect, it helps the 
7 3 
individual to have greater feelings of self-respect. ^ 
The parameters in the arguments are the same as 
those in Rawls's theory. The sources of disagreement, 
on the other hand, are elements that Rawls excludes. 
If the altruism that is dictated by society's Judeo- 
Christian attitude toward helping the poor were to over¬ 
come the material self-interest that is so powerful in our 
society, even these should vanish. The radical equality 
implied in the commandment to "love thy neighbor as 
thyself" would create a concern for the welfare of persons 
in all social positions which would result in the maximin 
rule and the difference principle. The result of providing 
for persons in all social positions is necessarily the 
same as providing for oneself when one may occupy any of 
those positions. 
American welfare policies and trends have grown out 
of a conflict of ideals, misunderstanding of social forces, 
and unbridled self-interest. Projecting the effects of 
the ideals alone, stripped of the influences of misper¬ 
ception and personal and class bias, I must conclude that 
Rawls's theory of justice is congruent with the ideals of 
welfare policy in the United States. 

JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE FINANCING 
OF MEDICAL CARE 
44 
The role of government in the financing of medical 
care in the United States has been a controversial aspect 
of welfare policy. The potential cost of any system of 
public financing is great, and will require that a powerful 
case be made before it will be accepted. Rawls’s theory 
of justice, as an ideal statement of welfare policy, should 
be helpful in an attempt to determine what public respon¬ 
sibility exists in the field of medical care. 
The first step is to place health care within the 
framework of Rawls's theory. Is health care a primary 
good? Does freedom of access to medical care come under 
the first principle as a basic liberty, or under one of the 
clauses of the second principle? Do the answers to these 
questions depend on the nature of the care in question 
(e.g., emergent vs. cosmetic surgery)? Only when these 
questions have been answered can we decide whether the 
system of financing medical care in the United States is 
just, and, if not, what alternatives might create a more 
just system. 
Health care, as well as health, is a primary good. 
Every rational person, in accordance with the principle of 
responsibility to self, may be presumed to want effective 
preventive care. (This position accepts the definition of 
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suicide as irrational.) Similarly, every sick rational 
person may be presumed to want the most effective possible 
curative or palliative care. This is so, because such 
care is the most prudent means of securing the natural 
primary good of health. Good health is in turn necessary 
for the paramount primary good of self-respect, because 
without good health the ability to fulfill one's plan of 
life is apt to be impaired. 
Access to health care must be available in accordance 
with the principle of equal liberties. Rawls's conception 
of the liberties covered by this principle is that 
persons are at liberty to do something when they are 
free from certain constraints either to do or not to 
do it and when their doing it or not doing it is 
protected from interference by other persons.74 
Thus all persons must be free either to avail themselves of 
health care, or not to avail themselves of health care, on 
an equal basis, and without interference from others. 
Rawls defines the limits of the constraints that may be 
placed upon such a liberty. He specifically states that the 
constraints that poverty and ignorance place on an indi¬ 
vidual's exercise of his or her liberty are considered 
under the difference principle; he does not construe these 
7 5 
constraints as essential infringements of liberty. J 
Thus establishing economic barriers to seeking health care 
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is acceptable under the first principle. Any economic 
inequities that affect an individual's ability to surmount 
those barriers are problems of the distribution of economic 
goods and are the concern of the difference principle. 
Rawls makes clear that such economic barriers may not be 
inflexible. A person may not be barred from medical care 
in violation of the natural duty, both for individuals and 
for institutions, to help a person who is in need or in 
7 f) 
danger.' The limits to this duty are defined by a balance 
of the urgency of the problem against the risk or loss to the 
77 
person providing aid. Thus, a provider of medical care 
has a duty to administer a narcotic antagonist to a person 
who has just suffered an acute respiratory arrest due to an 
overdose of heroin. Similarly, a hospital has a duty to 
provide potentially life-saving therapy to the victim of a 
myocardial infarction without regard to the patient's ability 
to pay for that care. This duty is limited only by the 
hospital's similar duty to its other patients or potential 
patients. Excessive demands on staff or facilities might 
create a situation in which not all who need care can be 
treated, so that a choice must be made as to who will re¬ 
ceive treatment. If this occurs frequently, society has a 
duty to try to allocate the resources necessary to meet the 
demand adequately. Similarly, the hospital may not simply 
turn away an indigent patient with a life threatening 
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problem that requires expensive care unless the assumption 
of the financial burden of that care will seriously 
threaten the absolute ability of the hospital to serve 
others with equally serious problems. (Such a threat is 
extremely unlikely unless gross mismanagement or under¬ 
endowment has weakened the institution.) 
The denial of medical attention for financial reasons 
is also limited by the commitment made by physicians and 
hospitals in assuming their roles. Rawls's principle of 
7 ft 
fairness' dictates that by voluntarily entering their pro¬ 
fession, physicians have accepted the benefits and oppor¬ 
tunities of that profession, and have thereby incurred an 
obligation to fulfill its duties. Both society and the 
medical profession have traditionally accepted these obli¬ 
gations, and have included some provision for the care of the 
poor and those in urgent need among them. Taking the Oath of 
Hippocrates or formally accepting a specific code of medical 
ethics may provide a basis for further obligations, but 
refraining from doing either of these things can not abridge 
the basic obligations of the profession. Similarly, having 
chosen to provide a certain spectrum of services, hospitals 
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have incurred an obligation to make those services available. 
These obligations, as well as natural duty, compel the pro¬ 
vision of care for the indigent. 
Thus we see that health care is a primary good, and as 
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such its distribution falls within the concern of justice 
as fairness. Equal freedom of access to health care is 
guaranteed to all by the principle of equal liberties. 
Issues of the financing of personal health care, on the other 
hand, are governed by the difference principle. .Economic 
limitations of access are also covered by the difference 
principle, except in situations where natural duty or 
professional obligation requires that care be made avail¬ 
able regardless of the patient's ability to pay. 
Any truly thorough application of Rawls's theory must 
include consideration of all the major economic, political, 
and social institutions of the society in question. If it 
is possible at all, it would be a gargantuan undertaking. 
I shall instead try to consider health care separately 
from the economy at large. There are important limits to 
such a separation. The fact that Medicaid benefits are 
currently linked with general public assistance income 
benefits points to one limit: rational poor relief policies 
require a coordinated approach to the problems of the poor. 
The enormity of the health care economy suggests another 
limit. ho sector of the economy that produces over nine 
percent of the gross national product can simply be plucked 
neatly away from the remaining ninety-one percent. 
At the same time, good reasons exist for attempting 
such a separation. The first is practical. It is much 
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more manageable to approach a system as enormous and 
heterogeneous as the United States economy one piece at a 
time. Once policy decisions have been made for the piece 
in question, then the problems of that piece's interfaces 
with the other parts of the system can be considered. 
This is how most legislation is formed, albeit imperfectly. 
A second reason for considering the health care economy 
separately is tradition. Ever since the endowment of 
charitable trusts began in Elizabethan England, problems 
of the poor such as medical care, education, food, and 
shelter have been treated separately. The provision of 
"in-kind benefits" incorporated into the Social Security 
Act expresses a common attitude among the more advantaged 
members of society: distrust of the poor. By providing 
food stamps or Medicaid benefits society limits the purposes 
for which its aid may be used. The poor can't buy sex, drugs, 
and fancy cars with in-kind benefits, as many of the 
non-poor ungenerously fear they would with cash benefits. 
For these reasons I will limit my discussion to the health 
care economy and a few inevitable interfaces with the 
remainder of the economy. 
I will examine five possible systems of health care 
financing. The first that I will discuss is a system of 
comprehensive health care for all residents. The possibility 
of some variable deductible or co-insurance provisions will 
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be considered. Next I will look at the system currently 
in use. It is a patchwork of varying state Medicaid olans 
for the poor, Medicare for the elderly and certain special 
patient groups, a variety of private insurance and pre¬ 
payment plans, and private out-of-pocket payments. The 
next two systems are insurance plans that have been proposed 
as potential improvements to the current system. One 
provides federally funded coverage for all hospital care, 
including both hospital and doctors' fees beyond a small 
deductible and coinsurance provision. The other provides 
coverage for catastrophic illnesses only, by requiring the 
payment of a large deductible that varies with the patient.'s 
income. Both of these systems would continue some of the 
elements of the present system. The last approach is a 
straight income maintenance program, which makes no 
special provision for medical care costs. 
In order to apply Rawls's theory in evaluating any 
of these plans, it is necessary to identify a least 
advantaged group. Rawls suggests we use income and wealth 
as an analog for a comprehensive index of primary goods, 
because the latter is prohibitively hard to design. In 
the special case of medical care, however, the primary 
good of health must receive special consideration, as it 
obviously will have a major influence on the need for care. 
The problem with Rawls's suggestion in this case is that 
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the correlation of health with wealth is so weak that 
we cannot reasonably substitute one for both. 
Using a combined measure of wealth and health we 
may be able to select a least favored group. On the other 
hand, we may be able to identify several groups each of which 
is a reasonable candidate for the position of least favored. 
In that case, demonstration that all of these groups are 
benefited by the inequality that causes their relative 
disadvantage would be required in order to assure that the 
difference principle is satisfied. If we find that it is 
quite impossible to identify a least advantaged group, we 
may be forced to guarantee equal economic access to health 
care in order to comply with the difference principle. 
The ideal situation in terms of medical care is one in 
which all persons have access to any medical care they need, 
and in which they can afford that care without undue hard¬ 
ship. Isolated from all other considerations, such a 
situation would satisfy Rawls's two principles. To the 
extent that illness is undeserved, it would satisfy the 
principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress, 
Rn 
which is included within the difference principle. 
The simplest way to arrange such a situation is to 
establish complete prepaid medical care. All inpatient 
and outpatient expenses would be billed to and paid by the 
federal government. No coinsurance or deductible payment 
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would be required. 
The question that justice as fairness asks here is 
whether the least advantaged person is benefited maximally 
in this case. The person who is least advantaged with 
respect to medical care financing is both in need of care 
and unable to afford that care without sacrificing some 
other of the minimal primary goods such as food and shelter. 
Assuming that levels of cash and non-medical in-kind 
benefits under existing programs are barely adequate to 
meet the minimal needs of healthy persons, any welfare 
recipient with any medical need would be included by such a 
definition of the least favored group. Over time, the 
least advantaged group could be expected to include all 
chronic welfare recipients. Clearly a system which pro¬ 
vided all necessary medical care free of charge would be 
of maximal benefit to these people, unless the expense of 
the system required a reduction in the barely minimal level 
of benefits provided by the welfare program. 
Another group who might be considered least advantaged 
are the medically indigent. They are able to support them¬ 
selves, but have unaffordably high medical expenses. These 
people have no crucial lack of primary goods, except for 
that imposed by their medical bills. An important group 
among the medically indigent are the elderly. Many of them 
live on relatively low pension incomes. At the same time, 
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their average medical bills are much higher than those 
of younger persons. These bills often force a choice 
between medical care and other minimal primary goods. The 
assumption by the federal government of the medically 
indigents' burden of medical expenses would clearly benefit 
them; the assumption of that burden without any coinsurance 
or deductible provisions would be of maximal benefit. This 
would be especially true for those with low incomes. 
Two major conditions must be met in order to provide 
this level of benefits. The first is that the medical care 
system be able to provide all the services that will be 
demanded when economic constraints are removed from all 
patients. The second is that the taxation necessary to pay 
for these services not lead to economic or social losses 
that would harm the least advantaged group more than the 
improvement in medical services would benefit them. 
The assumption that the system could handle the 
increased load is more reasonable than it might at first 
appear. Increased demand by people who had previously been 
unable to afford care would probably amount to less than a 
ten percent increase in the load on the system. This 
estimate assumes that five percent of the population are 
currently receiving no medical services, but will enter 
the system when care is free. It also assumes about a ten 
percent increase in the benefits provided to current 
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recipients of care under government programs, above any 
expenses they currently assume as out-of-pocket expend¬ 
itures. 
This increase of about ten percent in total demand 
would be offset by a similar decrease resulting from the 
restructuring of payment provisions. In 1975» about 
eighty percent of the population had private insurance 
coverage for hospital and surgical care, while only three 
81 
percent were covered for outpatient services. This 
situation makes the out-of-pocket expenditures for out¬ 
patient care higher than that for similar inpatient care, 
in spite of the markedly higher total bill for the latter. 
This creates an incentive to obtain the higher priced care. 
In a study of over 100,000 Medicare users enrolled in 
group practice prepayment plans, patients with prepaid out¬ 
patient care incurred only 91% of the total charges incurred 
by matched controls without such coverage. If two plans, for 
members of which high out of plan expenses were paid, are 
excluded, this figure drops to 83% of controls. This 
entire difference is the result of lower inpatient expenses 
among the prepayment plan members, whose inpatient expenses 
were only 78% (all plans) or 69% (excluding two plans) of 
8 ^ 
controls' inpatient expenses. Assuming that both physicians 
and patients will learn to choose the practice pattern that 
minimizes overall costs once the incentive provided by 
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current insurance patterns is removed, then we can 
expect a similar reduction in per patient expenses under 
a system of third party coverage of all services. 
A number of significant gains in efficiency are 
inherent in such a comprehensive system. The costs of 
billing and collection by health care providers would be 
lower, since a single itemized periodic bill for all 
services would be submitted to a single payment agency, 
instead of the current system of bills sent to each 
patient and each insuror. A system offering total com¬ 
prehensive coverage would also have no need to screen out 
bills for services that were ineligible for coverage, 
since there would be no ineligible services. Additional 
savings would result from the single contract nature of the 
system. Just as individual insurance policies have 
administrative costs that are about three times those of 
Q O 
group policies, ^ so multiple group policies have higher 
administrative costs than would a single "policy". 
Gains in quality and cost control are also likely under 
a single payment agency with power to withhold payment and 
with a primary responsibility to the needs of the taxpayer/ 
consumer. Quality control is possible because the payment 
agency would have great leverage to affect a physician's 
practice patterns. Physicians failing to meet certain 
standards could be required to get additional training or 
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to get second opinions prior to surgery as a condition of 
continued payment. Cost control would be an important part 
of the system. Fee schedules could be formulated by state 
medical associations, subject to review and approval by 
the payment agency, in a manner similar to that currently 
used to regulate public utility rates. Individual 
physicians might forego fee for service payments in favor 
of capitation payments or straight salary arrangements. 
All of these quality and cost control mechanisms have been 
employed successfully by various comprehensive medical 
care systems. 
The usual argument against a system of this kind is 
that it becomes clogged with demands for attention to minor 
problems that patients currently don't find worth the 
expense of medical attention. Horror stories of long 
waits for care under the British National Health Service 
are presented. While the prepayment plans in the previously 
cited study only show physician utilization expenses ranging 
from 2% to 26% above controls, one study projected demand 
for ambulatory physician services under comprehensive 
national health insurance as high as 75% above current 
levels. 
It may well be necessary to provide some form of 
annual deductible or coinsurance provision in order to 
prevent overuse of the system. The least advantaged must 
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be exempt from such a provision, however. When a small 
coinsurance fee was introduced by the Saskatchewan provincial 
health service, the poor markedly reduced their demand. 
Those better off increased theirs, however, when "they knew 
86 
they wouldn't have to wait in line so long." After 
institution of a 2^°/° coinsurance provision in one compre¬ 
hensive prepaid medical care plan, demand for physician 
services fell over 307°- At the same time, however, there 
was a 45% decrease in enrollment among the least well paid 
members of the plan, and no change in enrollment among all 
other groups. These figures suggest that the coinsurance 
provided such a barrier to the lowest paid members that 
O rp 
they no longer found the plan worthwhile. ' An acceptable 
way to limit demand might be a graduated coinsurance pro¬ 
vision with a range from zero for the least advantaged to 
25% for all those with incomes above a certain level. In 
order to prevent medical indigency, an annual ceiling could 
be placed on coinsurance payments. The primary problem 
with such a coinsurance plan is that it would be difficult 
and expensive to administer. 
An alternate approach would be to accept that demand 
will increase, and gear up the system to meet that demand. 
Assuming that the total increase would be for attention to 
complaints that could be dealt with on an outpatient basis, 
it could be met by increasing the number of physicians and 
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physician extenders (nurse practitioners and physician's 
assistants.) Based on current patterns of health care con¬ 
sumption, even the generous estimate of a 75% increase in 
demand would result in less than a 16% increase in total 
personal health expenses, even if the entire new demand 
were met by physicians. (Physicians' services now account 
for less than 21% of personal health expenditures.) If 
physician extenders met all of the increased demand, the 
cost increase would he a mere 6%. 
This approach would probably present more problems 
of personnel shortages than of unacceptable cost escalation. 
Even these problems will be solved within about twenty 
years at the current rate of physician education. Assuming 
a forty year average professional life for physicians, the 
number of practicing physicians in the U.S. will increase by 
67% by the year 2000. This projection is also based on the 
assumption that the number of new licenses issued annually 
to physicians be frozen at 1980 levels. Such an assumption 
is very conservative, given the trend over the past forty 
years. Actual changes will probably lead to an increase in 
the ratio of physicians to the population of between 50% 
O Q 
and 75%* it would seem likely, then, that the United 
States medical care system as currently organized has or 
will soon have the capacity to meet the demands imposed by 
totally government financed health care. 
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The second assumption behind the acceptability of 
such a plan is that society can stand to pay for it. This 
is more a question of economic redistribution than of costs; 
we are, after all, currently paying almost as much as the 
new system would cost. 
In projecting the effects of the new system on the 
federal budget and on the public tax burden I will work 
from figures for fiscal year 1976 (the last year for which 
complete data are available.) In that year, personal 
Oq 
health care expenditures totalled $126.2 billion. y Of 
this figure, $50.4 billion were paid by government programs, 
and $75*7 billion were paid by private sources.^ Of this 
latter figure, only $41.3 billion were direct out-of-pocket 
payments by consumers, the remainder being paid primarily 
91 
as benefits by private health insurance organizations. 
These insurance organizations had a total premium and sub- 
92 
scription income of $44.2 billion. 
Since the new system will cost roughly ten percent 
more than the old, it would have cost $138.8 billion had it 
been in place in 1976. All of this would have been paid 
out of the federal budget. Since the government actually 
paid $50.4 billion for health care, only $88.4 billion 
would have needed to be raised. Since there would have 
been no need for private medical insurance, all of the 
premiums for it would have been available to the government 
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without causing any added hardship to anyone. Subtracting 
that sum, $44.2 billion still would have been needed. If 
the health care system is to be paid for without federal 
deficit spending, 1976 tax receipts would have had to 
increase 14.1%. If a deficit had been incurred at the same 
rate as the rest of the federal budget, revenues would have 
required an 11.9% increase. 
This added tax burden could be distributed in various 
ways. However, two basic approaches are currently used by 
the federal government for funding social programs. The 
first is a progressively graduated tax on personal income. 
The ideal behind this method is that those who have the 
greatest ability to pay bear the greatest burden. Progressive 
taxation generally protects the least advantaged, and 
satisfies Rawls's difference principle. 
The other approach to taxation is patterned on insurance 
premiums. Social Security is funded in this way, with 
everyone paying a fixed percentage of their incomes up to 
a certain maximum annual amount. The idea behind this 
approach is that the benefits any individual can receive 
from certain social programs have fixed ceilings, and no 
individual should be required to pay for a larger share of 
a program than he or she may expect to use. This form of 
taxation gives the greatest advantage to the poor, who may 
receive from the program much more than they contribute; 
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and to the very rich, whose tax shrinks as a percentage of 
their income at the same time as their ability to pay is 
increasing. This kind of tax violates Rawls's "lexical 
93 
difference principle" by allowing the lot of the most 
advantaged to improve before the lot of a less advantaged 
group (in this case the middle class) has been maximized. 
Whichever approach is chosen, the effect of the tax 
increase on disposable personal income is small. If the 
required $44.2 billion were derived from increased employer 
and employee social insurance contributions, the maximum 
increase in employee contribution would amount to 2.6$) of 
gross income. The average tax increase would be only 2.0% 
of disposable personal income. The employers' share, how¬ 
ever, would be passed on to the consumer in price increases. 
These would consume at least an additional 1.7% of dispos¬ 
able income. The total would be at least 3.7% of dispos¬ 
able income. 
If instead the entire sum were derived from increased 
personal income taxes, the average tax bill would increase 
32.2%, an amount equal to 4.3% of adjusted gross income or 
3.7% of disposable personal income. The average tax 
increases at various income levels is shown in table 1 
(p. 62.) The average family whose income was below the median 
in 1976 of $14958, would benefit under this system. They 
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in taxes and out-of-pocket medical expenses under the 
old. Furthermore, the least well paid 80% of the population 
would pay less with an increase in progressive tax rates 
than they would pay as social insurance contributions and 
increased prices. 
It is extremely unlikely that the inflationary 
effects of either of these tax increases would lead to any 
marked social instability. An increase in income tax 
rates, which is clearly preferable under justice as 
fairness, places the greatest burden on those with the 
highest incomes. While they are therefore the ones with 
the greatest incentive to rebel against the new tax, they 
also have by far the most to lose from any major social 
or economic instability. ’While they might easily afford 
such losses, the losses would probably be as great as the 
cost of the tax increase. The wealthy would thus have no 
economic incentive for significantly reducing their social 
and economic cooperation in order to fight the tax 
increase. The increased cost of the system is also unlikely 
to cause major problems. The actual increase in expend¬ 
itures, as opposed to their redistribution, would amount 
to less than 1.1% of disposable personal income. The 
United States economy has absorbed far more inflation than 
that without major instability. 
Thus the two conditions that must be met in order for 
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a system of total government payment for medical care 
to succeed are reasonable. First, the medical care system 
would be able to meet, within the near future, the increased 
load it might expect under such a program. Second, the 
actual cost increase due to such a program would be a 
relatively small burden for the economic system, and its 
creation would be unlikely to cause costly social 
instability. 
In contrast to this system, the current patchwork of 
medical insurance programs and out-of-pocket payments is 
grossly unjust. The care that the least advantaged groups 
receive is variable, but it is rarely as complete as the 
care received by many in more advantaged groups. State 
Medicaid provisions range from non-existent in Arizona, 
through varying degrees of inadequacy and limitation, to 
a few reasonably complete programs. In 1972 six states did 
not pay for prescription drugs; thirteen did not pay for 
emergency hospital services; seventeen did not pay for 
prosthetic devices; nineteen did not pay for clinic services; 
96 
twenty-one did not pay for physical therapy. A child 
whose family could not afford penicillin for a strep throat 
might be left to develop rheumatic heart disease; if valve 
replacement surgery became necessary years later, it would 
be covered even though the penicillin was not. A diabetic 
might have to buy his or her own insulin, and, after an 
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amputation, a prosthesis in order to be able to walk. 
The pattern of services provided under Medicaid is 
inefficient and at times seemingly oblivious to some of 
the basic medical needs of the poor. Anyone whose medical 
expenses exceed available insurance coverage is reduced 
to abject poverty before becoming eligible for Medicare 
or Medicaid funds. The elderly, with their often limited 
resources, still pay far higher out-of-pocket expenses 
than those without Medicare coverage. 
The shortcomings of this system are obvious, if not 
shocking. The poor are subjected to the unnecessary risk 
of early disability and death, because society does not 
guarantee the availability of proven, inexpensive treat¬ 
ments. Not only is the welfare of the poor sacrificed to 
save a few tax dollars, but it is sacrificea in ways that 
in the long run will waste far more dollars than were 
originally saved. The current system stands in violation 
not only of Rawls's difference principle, but also of all 
three of his principles of rational choice, the principles 
of effective means, inclusiveness, and greater likelihood. 
(This of course assumes that the objective of medical care 
programs for the poor is to assure them the best possible 
health. If, for example, the goals of a state Medicaid 
program include guaranteeing a livelihood for cardiac 
surgeons, or assuaging the public conscience at minimal 
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expense, it may be that the current system does at least 
satisfy the principles of rational choice.) 
The two proposed insurance systems fail to solve the 
worst of these problems. One of them would guarantee to 
all residents insurance coverage similar to most Blue 
Cross - Blue Shield plus major medical plans; the other 
would provide only major medical coverage. Neither of 
these programs address the issues of preventive care and 
outpatient care of the poor and elderly; they rely on the 
continuation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to deal 
with these problems to the extent that they now do. 
Unfortunately, these are precisely the programs that have 
failed to benefit satisfactorily the least advantaged 
groups. Even those proposals which include these insurance 
coverages and reform of Medicare and Medicaid would retain 
the use of deductibles and coinsurance which are such strong 
deterrents to the use of the system by those most in need 
of its benefits. Under such a system, the benefits to the 
least advantaged are far from maximal as required by the 
difference principle. 
The new insurance plans would help one group of the 
least advantaged. The plans provide some protection against 
medical indigency for the middle class person who develops 
a ruinously expensive illness, and who has inadequate 
private insurance coverage. The number of such persons is 
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small, however, when compared with 45 or 50 million poor 
and elderly who are inadequately served. 
Thus the two insurance approaches, like the current 
system, fail to solve the problems of providing necessary 
basic services to the poor and the elderly. The problems 
of Medicare and Medicaid remain, including the presence 
of copayment provisions that discourage the least favored 
from seeking care, and the senseless denial of an ounce of 
prevention while granting many pounds of attempted cure. 
Provision of hospitalization coverage without outpatient 
coverage perpetuates the current inefficient use of our 
medical care resources. While inpatient care is a necessary 
part of any thoroughly just system of medical care, its 
provision alone fails to remedy the largest and most 
pressing violations of the difference principle and the 
principles of rational choice in American medical care 
financing. 
The fifth approach to the problem is that of a 
guaranteed minimum income with no special programs for 
provision of health care. This is the most directly 
Rawlsian in that it assumes that a minimum level of income 
and wealth can guarantee economic access to adequate 
levels of the other primary goods. It has the added 
advantage of granting to the least advantaged group the 
greatest freedom in choosing what to do with the benefits 
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provided to them by society. This is a refreshing change 
from the paternalism of in-kind benefits to the poor. At 
the same time, however, according to the principle of 
responsibility to self, an individual's only rational 
choice about medical care is to guarantee that it is avail¬ 
able, whenever and in whatever degree it is needed. A 
person's failure to provide rationally for the contingency 
of medical need could justify society in paternalistically 
making the necessary provisions, according to Rawls's 
96 
principles of paternalism. 
While an income policy ignores the lack of correlation 
of health with money, the minimum income would presumably 
be sufficient to allow the least advantaged to purchase 
health insurance, and presumably they would do so. Assuming 
that such an income policy were adopted in the United States 
today, however, the problem would not immediately be solved. 
Unless the standard range of health insurance benefits were 
changed, the incentive to use inpatient instead of out¬ 
patient services would remain, with its inherent 
inefficiency. 
An income maintenance policy that provided a minimum 
income that could pay for health insurance would, like a 
comprehensive care plan, create an increase in demand for 
outpatient services. Such an increase would lead to fee 




In our capitalist economy, a strong income maintenance 
policy would tend to benefit the rich and the poor at the 
expense of those in between. This is true even if the 
minimum income is funded by a progressive scheme of tax¬ 
ation. The elevated incomes of the least advantaged would 
lead to increased demand throughout the economy. Since 
most members of the middle class do not have income pro¬ 
ducing capital investments, they would not benefit from 
the increased profitability that comes with times of high 
demand. The rich who own the means of production of most 
goods and services, stand to profit greatly in the economy, 
an effect of an income maintenance policy which would tend 
to counteract its cost to the rich in increased taxes. 
This kind of situation, in which the poor and rich gain 
but the middle class loses, violates Rawls's lexical 
difference principle. 
Thus while an adequate income policy could remedy the 
worst injustices of the current medical care financing 
system, it would still fail to satisfy the principle of 
effective means, because of its reliance on traditional 
hospitalization insurance. It might also violate the 





John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness provides 
a philosophical framework that is a reasonable ideal 
against which to evaluate the ethical adequacy of 
welfare policy in the United States. It is a suitable 
theory largely because of the similarity of its principles 
to the motivating ideals behind American welfare policy, 
which are an expression of the Lnglish heritage of our 
laws and attitudes toward the poor. Rawls's theory is 
particularly helpful because it provides a clear hierarchy 
of conditions that a just social institution or policy 
should satisfy. 
When we apply justice as fairness to the financing 
of medical care in the United States, we find that the 
current system suffers from several major ethical short¬ 
comings. The most important of these is its inadequate 
provision for the health care of the poor and elderly. 
Of four alternative financing schemes, two providing for 
increased publicly funded insurance coverage for hospital 
care fail to remedy these inadequacies. They would help 
somewhat to reduce the incidence of medical indigence, 
another major problem of the current system. A third 
approach would provide a guaranteed minimum income instead 
of in-kind benefits. This plan would solve the worst of 
the problems of medical care for the poor and elderly. 
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It would do so primarily at the expense of the middle class, 
and it would not protect tne middle class from the possi¬ 
bility of ruinous medical bills. The final option is a 
federally funded program of comprehensive medical care 
for all. This approach solves the problem of equally 
adequate care for all; it distributes the cost of the 
system fairly and in a socially bearable fashion; it 
provides the most satisfactory approach of any of the plans 
to the problems of cost and quality control; and it 
provides greater rewards for efficient use of medical 
resources than any of the other plans. 
All four alternatives to the current situation would 
improve the justice of medical care financing. The plan 
for comprehensive federally funded care is the most just 
alternative, because only it satisfies the requirement 
of the difference principle of Rawls's theory. It also 
has the secondary advantage of encouraging appropriate, 
rational use of resources. Future changes in American 
medical care financing should therefore be directed 
toward the realization of a comprehensive system of 
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